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I INTRODUCTION
The Constitutional Court (CC), in adjudicating socio-economic rights
cases, has (in addition to separation-of-powers and institutional-competence
considerations) been influenced by the form of justice toward which it is
inclined, namely distributive justice as opposed to corrective justice. This
fact has significantly influenced the kinds of remedies granted by the CC,
which have tended to guarantee socio-economic rights as collective rather
than individual rights. The approach of the CC to remedies ties in with the
fact that the Constitution1 itself is implicitly imbued with distributive justice:
even where the Constitution guarantees what appears to be individual rights,
their enforcement is subject to the values that promote the public good and
common interest. In addition, the social and economic context within
which the Constitution is enforced dictates that even seemingly individual-
ized socio-economic rights must often be enforced as ‘group rights’.
The purpose of this paper is to establish a theoretical platform for an
understanding of how different notions of justice (corrective vs distributive)
influence the remedies that courts grant. The corrective justice philosophy
demands that victims be put in the position they would have been in but for
the violation of their rights. On the other hand, the distributive-justice
philosophy is based on a recognition of the constraints of putting victims in
the same position they would have been in had the violation not occurred.
The distributive justice philosophy does not, however, focus solely on the
interests of the victim. A court basing its decision on distributive justice will
decline to put the victim in the position he or she would have been in but for
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the violation if this would have a negative impact on other legitimate
interests.2
II CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE FORMS OF JUSTICE
DISTINGUISHED
In order to understand the issues related to constitutional remedies, one
needs to understand the goals that courts seek to achieve when they enforce
particular types of remedies.3 As mentioned above, the remedies that a court
chooses will be determined by the kind of justice to which that court is
inclined, either generally or in a particular case. It has been submitted that the
rules governing the choice of remedy cannot, and should not, be fashioned
apart from and independent of the adjudicator’s belief about the nature and
justice of the underlying claim.4 It is therefore important to understand the
different forms of justice that courts pursue.
(a) The ethos of corrective justice
The traditional conception of litigation as guided by corrective justice
reflects a nineteenth-century vision of society, which promoted the
individual as an autonomous entity.5 The corrective-justice theory is also
guided by a vision of libertarianism — a vision which prefers corrective
justice rather than distributive justice. Those who subscribe to libertarianism
are of the view that each person has the right to live his or her life in any way
he or she chooses, as long as he or she respects the equal rights of others. The
government exists only to protect people from the use of force by others.6
From this perspective, individual freedom cannot be sacrificed for the sake of
the common good; and each person possesses an inviolability based on justice
that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.7
In terms of this view, the primary function of a court is the resolution of
disputes in order to achieve fair results in respect of human interaction; and
to maintain the autonomy of each individual.8 It is for this reason that the
supporters of libertarianism define human rights in a negative manner. In
terms of this philosophy, all that we need are those rights that guarantee
2 Kent Roach ‘The limits of corrective justice and the potential of equity in
constitutional remedies’ (1991) 33 Arizona LR 859 at 859.
3 Michael L Wells & Thomas A Eaton Constitutional Remedies: A Reference Book for
the United States Constitution (2002) xxv.
4 Owen M Fiss The Civil Rights Injunction (1978) 91.
5 Abram Chayes ‘The role of the judge in public law litigation’ (1979) 89 Harvard
LR 1281 at 1285.
6 Davis Boaz ‘The coming of libertarian age’ in (1997) 19 CATO Policy Report,
available at http://www.heartland.org/pdf/63011a.pdf (last accessed 25 June 2006).
7 Michael J Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 2 ed (1998) at 16. See also John
Rawls A Theory of Justice (1999) 3.
8 Chayes op cit note 5 at 1285.
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non-interference from others in our enterprise of seeking autonomy;9 and
litigation is viewed as a vehicle to restore the autonomy of those whose rights
have been interfered with. Libertarianism places much emphasis on the
concept of property and the unfairness of distributing property that had been
gained through individual effort. Therefore libertarians reject the welfare
state in favour of a liberal non-interventionist state that respects property
rights.10 Whenever property is unjustly taken away, libertarianism demands
that it be returned to the rightful owner (hence the relevance of corrective
justice).
The philosophy of corrective justice recognizes the fact that the complete
prevention of legal wrongs is impossible. However, this philosophy
perceives the law as a tool for restoring those who have been wronged to the
position they would have been in but for the wrong.11 Aristotle defined
corrective justice (which he favoured above distributive justice) as the kind
of justice ‘which plays a rectifying role in a transaction between man and
man’12 and he insisted that judges must posses the intellectual virtue of
practical wisdom in order to determine the just result in all cases.13
Corrective justice has also been described as compensatory justice
associated with three essential features, namely: (i) that the parties are treated
as equals; (ii) that there must be damage inflicted by one party on another;
and (iii) that the remedy granted must seek to restore the victim to the
condition he or she had been in before the violation.14 Once a violation is
proven, the judge has to insist on a full correction without attempting ‘either
to balance the affected interests or changing . . . behaviour in the future’15 —
that is to say, the judge must focus on restoration of the status quo.
In modern private law, corrective justice is not only prominent in tort
(delict) law, but also has a presence in property and contract law.16 For
example, when parties enter into a contract it is assumed that they begin as
equals who accept corresponding rights and duties. An omission by one party
9 J Garret ‘The limits of libertarianism and the promise of a qualified care ethic’
(2004), available at http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/libcrit.htm (last accessed 25
June 2006).
10 See Christopher Heath Wellman ‘Justice’ in Robert L Simon (ed) The Blackwell
Guide to Social and Political Philosophy (2002) 60 at 70. See also generally Alan Ryan
‘Liberalism’ in Robert E Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds) A Companion to Contemporary
Political Philosophy (1995) 291.
11 See Kent Roach Constitutional Remedies in Canada (1994) at 3–17–18.
12 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics V at 2–5, as quoted by Mark C Modak-Truran
‘Corrective justice and the revival of judicial virtue’ (2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law &
Humanities 249 at 250.
13 See Modak-Truran op cit note 12.
14 Dinah Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law (1999) at 38.
15 Roach op cit note 11 at 3–2.
16 See Curtis Bridgeman Strict Liability and the Fault Standard in Comparative Justice
Accounts of Contract Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 146, Florida
State University College of Law, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=669504
(last accessed 22 June 2006).
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to discharge his or her duty, for example by not paying the price or delivering
the goods, destabilizes the equality of the parties. It leads to an unjustifiable
gain by one party and a corresponding loss to the other party. The effect of
such conduct is that it changes the position of both parties, unfairly
advantaging one and disadvantaging the other. This is what is meant by
destabilization of the parties’ equality and the purpose of the law in this
situation is to restore the equality.17 The same destabilization of equality is
present in the case of delictual wrongs because of the alteration of the
victim’s position as a consequence of the wrongdoer’s conduct. The victim
will have to endure physical, emotional, financial or other loss which would
not have occurred if the wrong was not committed. According to Aristotle
‘[c]orrective justice is the intermediate between an involuntary gain and loss.
According to the corrective justice understanding of legal adjudication, the law
looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as
equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted
injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this kind of injustice being an
inequality, the judge tries to equalize it.’18
The purpose of the law, from this perspective, becomes one of looking
back to the position of the parties before the wrong was committed and
assessing the impact of the wrong on the status quo. It is for this reason that
corrective justice has been described as backward-looking, focusing as it does
on the particular events that affected a particular individual.19 It is not,
however, enough that the victim’s status has been altered: there must be
proof that the alteration has resulted from the defendant’s wrong for liability
on the part of the defendant to be established.20 The question posed by
corrective justice, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has suffered an injustice
at the hands of the defendant.21
A judge is required to consider only the distinctive character of the injury
rather than the virtue of the parties; and to determine which party inflicted
the injury and which party suffered it.22 Corrective justice is therefore not
concerned with the character of the parties. According to Aristotle, an injury
17 Ernst J Weinrib ‘Corrective justice in a nutshell’ (2002) 52 University of Toronto LJ
349. See also Modak-Truran op cit note 12 at 252.
18 Aristotle, as quoted by Modak-Truran op cit note 12 at 256 (my emphasis).
According to Aristotle, corrective justice takes the form of an arithmetical progres-
sion: If there are two equal parties (A and B), and after a transaction,Ahas injured B to
the extent of C, their relation is: A + C = B − C. To restore the balance, the judge
takes C fromAand gives it to B, creating a new relationship: (A+ C) − C = (B – C) +
C, an arithmetical mean between gain and loss in which the relative positions of the
parties is once again the same.
19 Ken Cooper-Stephenson ‘Principle and pragmatism in the law of remedies’ in
Jeffrey Berryman (ed) Remedies: Issues and Perspectives (1991) 1 at 21.
20 See Roach op cit note 11 at 3–19.
21 Ernst J Weinrib ‘Restitutionary damages as corrective justice’ (2000) 1 Theoretical
Inquiries in Law 1 at 3.
22 Modak-Truran op cit note 12 at 252.
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is an injury: ‘It makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad
man or a bad man a good one’.23
The discretionary space of a judge who adopts a corrective-justice
approach is very limited in that he or she has to live up to the demands of
causation and restoration.24 In remedial terms, the catalogue of remedies
from which the judge can choose is also very limited. He or she is restricted
to those remedies that restore (in so far as it is possible) victims to their
previous position. The court therefore focuses on establishing liability which
can be linked to the wrongful conduct of the defendant as guided by the
principles of liability and causation.25 The wrong is an essential element
because it is the right-infringing wrong which forms the subject of the
claim.26 It is unjust for a defendant to be required to remedy that for which
fault has not been proven on his or her part; and if fault is proven, it is unjust
if the victim is not restored to the position he or she had been in before the
wrong had been committed.27
Corrective justice is, furthermore, not concerned with the impact of its
remedies on the defendant or on third parties. The court focuses only on the
interests of the plaintiff. An example of this view can be found in a Canadian
case where, in ordering compensation against a university, a dissenting judge
was not concerned with whether or not the order would negatively impact
on the University’s already strapped finances. Justice Wilson in McKinney v
University of Guelph (Mckinney case)28 observed as follows:
‘I recognize that the enforced retirement of the appellants was not motivated by
unconstitutional animus but rather by the severe fiscal restraints under which
the universities have been forced to operate. I also appreciate that an award of
damages in addition to reinstatement will place an additional monetary burden
on these already financially strapped institutions. Impecuniosity and good faith
are not, however, a proper basis on which to deny an award of compensatory
damages. Such damages are clearly part of the web of remedies that go to make
an injured party whole.’29
As is shown below,30 the majority disagreed, taking into consideration the
financial impact that compensation would have on the university. According
to the majority, in addition to the interests of the aggrieved staff, the interest
of the public in the operation of universities needs to be considered.
23 Aristotle, as quoted by Modak-Truran op cit note 12 at 257.
24 Roach op cit note 2 at 859.
25 Roach op cit note 11 at 3–17.
26 Shelton op cit note 14 at 39.
27 See Gregory C Keating ‘Distributive and corrective justice in tort law of acci-
dents’ (2000) 74 Southern California LR 193 at 198.
28 (1990) 76 DLR (4th) 545; [1990] 3 SCR 229.
29 The text of the case is available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/
1990rcs3–229/1990rcs3–229.html ( last accessed 18 September 2006).
30 Under the heading ‘The ethos of distributive justice’.
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(b) Corrective justice and traditional litigation processes
Corrective justice has played an important role in defining and modelling
traditional private-law litigation processes. Traditional litigation procedures
are primarily aimed at establishing the liability of the defendant, if any.
Traditional litigation is also adversarial in nature. In such litigation it is
assumed that the judge is an independent and neutral participant with a
passive role to play.31 The role of the judge is simply to determine liability,
and once this is done, to restore the parties to the position they had been in
before the wrong leading to liability occurred. The judge is supposed to be
independent and impartial, which is the reason why he or she is excluded
from any partisan role and reserves judgment until presentation of the facts
and arguments.32 A judge cannot answer any questions unless they are put to
him or her by the appropriate party, who must also follow the appropriate
procedure.33
In traditional litigation, the remedial process begins only after the
establishment by the plaintiff of the defendant’s liability. It is very important
to identify, with precision, not only the victim but also the perpetrator of the
wrong. The victim in this form of litigation is identified by using very strict
rules of standing — the plaintiff must establish his or her standing by proving
that he or she had a right, the enjoyment of which was brought to an end by
the actions of the defendant. The plaintiff has to stand not only in the
position of a victim but also as a beneficiary of any relief that may be claimed
from the court.34
The litigation process focuses on the wrong that is alleged to have been
committed, and the incidents leading up to the wrong are very important as
determinants of liability. Once the wrong has been established, the remedy is
deemed to flow naturally and smoothly from this process.35 The remedies
that the courts grant after finding of a violation must be connected to the
rights and duties of the parties and must be intended to restore those duties
and rights. This requires that a close relationship be maintained between
31 See, generally, Susan P Sturm ‘A normative theory of public law remedies’
(1991) 79 Georgetown LJ 1355 at 1360.
32 Ibid at 1383.
33 Traditionally, the victim of a violation was identified as an individual litigating
for him- or herself. However, the growing awareness that some transactions could no
longer be viewed as bilateral gave birth to the class or representative action. See
Chayes op cit note 5 at 1283.
34 Chayes op cit note 5 at 1290. A multilateral transaction can lead to multilateral
damage, and it may be convenient that the claims of all those who have suffered at the
hands of the same defendant or defendants be heard in the same suit. In spite of this,
the element of damage and ‘victimhood’ still has to be established on behalf of each
individual plaintiff. The group is just an aggregation of identifiable individuals who
have the same interests and have suffered the same harm, sometimes at the hands of
the same defendant.
35 Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C Yeazell ‘The ordinary and the extraordinary
in institutional litigation’ in (1980) 93 Harvard LR 465 at 474.
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rights and remedies; and the nature of the remedy is determined by the
nature of the liability and the harm done.
This form of litigation, as supported by corrective justice, is not suited to
structural or systemic violations arising from organizational behaviour. This
is because of the complexities of proving causal responsibility for the harms
that are caused by such violations.36 Systemic violations are those violations
that establish themselves and endure in a sustained manner as part of an
institution’s behaviour. Often the violation will not be the product of actions
of identifiable officials, but instead it may arise from a web of institutional
practices entrenched in an ad hoc manner as part of the operational system.
The violation is but a symptom of a bigger problem requiring a systemic
approach for its resolution.
However, this does not mean that corrective justice should be discarded
completely where violations result from organizational behaviour. It may, for
instance, be used to address discrete wrongs suffered by individuals at the
hands of state officials. Where a constitutional violation arises from a
‘one-shot’ wrong and is suffered by an identifiable victim at the hands of an
identifiable wrongdoer, corrective justice can be used to correct such
harm.37
It is important to note, however, that corrective justice’s insistence on full
correction sometimes places unrealistic demands on the courts and fetters
their ability to do justice. This is especially so where a number of interests are
implicated by a case: ‘[corrective justice] cannot guide a court’s sense of
priorities in responding to patterns and practices of violations in institutions
or in accommodating social interests in devising remedies’.38 With this
model of justice there is a fusion of rights and remedies as the purpose of the
latter is to realize the former. A remedy is not suited to the right if it cannot
restore the position of the victim. On the other hand, distributive justice
suggests that, where necessary, rights and remedies can be treated as two
separate things. The needs of justice may demand that the remedy adopted
should not necessarily be that which leads to the full realization of the right.
It is this difference between corrective and distributive justice that runs
through the debate on the relationship between rights and remedies.39
(c) The ethos of distributive justice
Distributive justice is that domain of justice concerned with the distribution
of benefits and burdens among members of a given group who enjoy the
36 Roach op cit note 2 at 865.
37 Ibid at 870.
38 Ibid at 861.
39 Lawrence Gene Sager ‘Fair measure: The legal status of underenforced constitu-
tional norms’ (1978) 91 Harvard LR 1212; David M Walker The Law of Civil Remedies
in Scotland (1974); and Daryl J Levinson ‘Rights essentialism and remedial equilibra-
tion’ (1999) 99 Columbia LR 857.
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relevant benefits and shoulder the relevant burdens.40 The benefits may
come to such members simply by virtue of their membership of the group or
as a result of some entitlement.41 The concept of distributive justice, unlike
corrective justice based on the philosophy of libertarianism, is supported by
utilitarianism. The philosophy of utilitarianism is based on the belief in an
individual’s wellbeing, but it also lays emphasis on the common good of
society and the wellbeing of all its members.
From a utilitarian perspective, the law and the courts have important roles
to play in the enterprise of realizing collective wellbeing. In terms of this
view, courts have to consider interests other than those of the parties before
them. In this context, actions, policies, and institutions are judged in terms of
the extent to which they maximize overall happiness and wellbeing.42 It is
this form of justice that persons such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
advocated in the nineteenth century. They viewed the laws that existed then
as morally atrocious because they prevented rather than promoted overall
happiness.43 Utilitarianism also represents itself in the form of what has been
described as communitarianism, a concept which challenges libertarianism
on the ground that an individual is not an end, but exists together with others
with whom he or she pursues a common end.44 Communitarians hold that
an ideal society is one that defines individuals in terms of what they are and
the values that they have.45
Unlike bilateral corrective justice, distributive justice is, therefore,
multilateral. Justice from this perspective is the standard by which conflicting
values are reconciled and competing conceptions of good accommodated or
resolved.46 Though a court case may have only two parties, distributive
justice views it as having community-wide implications. As a result, the
court focuses on what Cooper-Stephenson has described as collateral
interests that need secondary consideration.47 This has arisen from the
recognition that not all interested persons may be party to a suit, and yet their
interests may be affected by the outcome of that suit.48 While corrective
40 SeeAristotle, as quoted by Modak-Truran op cit note 12 at 250.
41 Dennis Klimchuk ‘On the autonomy of corrective justice’ (2003) 23 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 49 at 50.
42 Wellman op cit note 10 at 60.
43 Ibid at 61.
44 See Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift Liberals & Communitarians (1996) 10. See
also generally Will Kymlicka ‘Community’ inAllan Ryan, Robert E Goodin & Philip
Pettit (eds) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (1995) 366; and T M
Scanlon What We Owe Each Other (2000).
45 Mulhall & Swift op cit note 44 at 13.
46 Sandel op cit note 7 at 6
47 Cooper-Stephenson op cit note 19 at 19
48 Ibid. See also Lon Fuller ‘The forms and limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 Har-
vard LR 353.
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justice seeks to explain why ‘this defendant is liable to this plaintiff’,49
distributive justice focuses on the broader societal interests.50
Distributive justice is based on an acknowledgement that it is not possible
in all cases to put the victim of a wrong in the position they would have been
in but for the violation. In the modern context it is not always possible to
identify discrete wrongs and the wrongdoer with precision.51 Harm may be
inflicted on groups of people, and not only on an individual victim, and may
arise from conduct that cannot be associated, in liability terms, with a specific
defendant. Where the state is the obligation-bearer in this context, it may be
necessary for the court to look at the wider obligations of the state and not
just its liability in the case at hand. Without asking whether or not
government is at fault, the court could, in some circumstances, dedicate its
efforts to finding solutions that may do away with the harm. In this context,
therefore, the liability rules of corrective justice will be of limited
application.
In England the remedies arising from the administration of distributive
justice have their roots in the law of equity, the application of which began as
a response to the inadequacies of the common law in remedying certain
violations. Historically, the common law had been a rigid body of law, which
recognized only specific causes of action through the writ system, granting
rigid remedies to fit the specific writ. What equity did was to introduce a
sense of flexibility into the law and to soften the common law and make it
fairer.52 It is this form of flexibility that has been embraced by the proponents
of distributive justice. Equity has been described as a complex theory and
doctrine which requires balancing of the affected interests before intrusive
remedies are ordered.53 This is in addition to affirming the judge’s broad and
flexible remedial discretion.54 This balancing and wide discretion has
allowed courts to award remedies that may be short of full correction. This is
because ‘[t]he disengagement of right and remedy in equity allows judges to
provide less than rectification demands’.55 In addition, equity allows the
court to focus not only on the needs of the parties but also to consider third
party interests implicated by the case. Although equity is not part of South
49 Lionel Smith ‘Restitution: The heart of corrective justice’ (2001) 79 Texas LR
2115 at 2116.
50 It is not true, as is suggested by Horowitz, that all forms of adjudication focus on
ascertaining whether one party has a right and another a duty. See Donald Horowitz
The Courts and Social Policy (1977) at 34. While this may be true of traditional litiga-
tion based on corrective justice, it is not true of modern litigation based on distribu-
tive justice. The question of alternatives is central to distributive justice as it helps the
court find solutions that address, as much as is possible, the interests that need to be
balanced.
51 Roach op cit note 11 at 3–19.
52 Jeffrey Berryman The Law of Equitable Remedies (2000) 2.
53 See Chayes op cit note 5 at 1292–3.
54 Roach op cit note 2 at 887.
55 Ibid at 860.
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African law and although discretionary remedialism has not been adopted eo
nomine, it may be argued that similar principles are implicitly employed by
the courts in various situations.
Unlike the case with corrective justice, a judge dispensing distributive
justice will rely on the breadth and flexibility of the equitable remedial
powers without careful attention to the demands of causation and restora-
tion.56 Rather than be guided by strict rules of procedure, and be bound by
the existing causes of action and remedies, distributive justice allows the
court very wide discretion to fashion causes of action and remedies as the
needs of justice demand. Distributive justice puts equity in its right place by
treating it as a primary source of law. In some common-law countries, a
court is not bound by the requirement that equitable remedies will only be
available where common law remedies are proven to be inadequate,
enabling it to embrace the full breadth of equity and its benefits:
‘It may act so as to adjust and reconcile competing claims and so as to accord full
justice to all the real parties . . .; if necessary, persons not originally connected
with the litigation may be brought before the court so that their rights in the
subject matter may be determined and enforced. In addition, the court may go
beyond the matters immediately underlying its equitable jurisdiction and
decide whatever other issues and give whatever other relief may be necessary
under the circumstances. Only in that way can equity do complete rather than
truncated justice.’57
Unlike corrective justice, distributive justice does not emphasize liability
but effects of one’s activities. Its multilateral nature compels a court to
ascertain how its remedial measures, irrespective of whether or not liability
has been declared, will impact on the interests of other people. The
backward-looking nature of corrective justice, geared towards ascertaining
liability, may not be suitable to address all current legal problems. Many legal
problems and disputes are no longer bilateral. The world we live in has
complex and interdependent interests, a reality which the courts must
acknowledge when they choose remedies.58 All the interests implicated by
the case must be considered and the impact of the remedy on them assessed.
Due to the need to avoid repetition of the same conduct, distributive
justice allows remedies to have a future direction and focuses on the needs of
the community as a whole. This should be contrasted with corrective justice,
which is backward-looking and focuses on the individual claimant. It is true
that the process of administering distributive justice may begin with a
pronouncement on the legal consequences of past actions. However, unlike
the backward-looking liability rules of corrective justice, distributive justice
will use such past actions as a basis to determine future actions.59 In this
setting the role of the court at the remedial stage is not to determine where
56 Ibid at 859.
57 Murphy J in Porter v Warner Co 328 US 395 (1946) at 398.
58 Roach op cit note 11 at 3–19.
59 See Chayes op cit note 5 at 1294.
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fault lies. Rather, it is to develop a plan that fairly and effectively realizes the
rights not only at the time of the case but in future as well.60 The court will
identify the needs that have to be addressed, and it will select remedies in
response to them. This is important because remedies based on needs are
more directly relevant to the future of those who have been wronged in the
past.61
The remedy must be one that satisfies all the interests concerned. The
emphasis should not be solely on the correction of the wrong; and complete
correction may be ignored for the sake of addressing other interests. It is true
that both corrective and distributive justice demand that where a defendant is
found to have violated constitutional rights, the violation must be stopped.
However, where distributive justice differs from corrective justice is that it
will insist on full correction of the violation ‘absent special circumstances’.62
‘Special circumstances’ means those circumstances which may impact on the
remedy. This may, for instance, include the costs associated with the
implementation of the remedy. Special circumstances also include factors
that may affect interests other than those of the parties in the court case. Such
other interests have to be balanced against those of the parties. Balancing of
these interests may not be possible where a judge insists on full correction of
the wrong:
‘Once the constraints of corrective justice are abandoned, I can imagine a
justice system in which the needs of the plaintiffs, of affected interests and of
society are placed directly on the remedial agenda of courts. Victims will not
have to concentrate on tracing the harms which can be attributed to past
wrongs, but rather can educate the court about their present needs. Likewise,
governmental defendants will not have to channel their energies into claims of
innocence and lack of responsibility for harms. They can directly educate
courts about the resource constraints they face. For their part, judges could be
directly concerned with the practical prospects for genuine reform and
reconciliation. They would not have to pretend that the remedies they order
inexorably follow, fit and repair the extent of wrongdoing.’63
The approach described above requires the court to consider the costs and
benefits of a particular remedy. For instance, damages in socio-economic
rights litigation deplete the already limited state resources, which may affect
the state’s capacity to deliver goods and services.64 In the Canadian case of
McKinney, for example, the majority thought that requiring the university to
adhere to the statutory state retirement age requirements would adversely
affect the University’s already strapped finances and would impact on the
public interest. Dickson CJ, for the majority, held as follows:
60 Sturm op cit note 31 at 1393.
61 Roach op cit note 2 at 864.
62 Wells & Eaton op cit note 3 at xxv.
63 Roach op cit note 2 at 864.
64 See Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005(2) SA359 (CC)
(Rail Commuters case) para 80.
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‘In assessing whether there has been minimal impairment of a constitutional
right, consideration must be given not only to the reconciliation of claims of
competing individuals or groups but also to the proper distribution of scarce
resources, here access to the valuable research and other facilities of universities.
The universities had a reasonable basis for concluding that mandatory retirement
impaired the relevant right as little as possible given their pressing and
substantial objectives. Against the detriment to those affected must be weighed
the benefit of the universities’ policies to society.’65
It should be noted that the various remedies come with a number of costs,
not only financial but other costs such as forbearance of benefits and the
limitation of rights and burdens. Some of these costs are not only relevant at
the remedial stage but may even, on occasion, override remedying a
violation.66 While a court’s approach in granting remedies may be intended
to realize full protection of the infringed rights, it may come with
unreasonable costs to the defendant. This is in addition to imposing burdens
on third parties not before the court. Though the grant of remedies should
not necessarily be deterred on the ground that they impose burdens on the
defendant, these burdens cannot be ignored as they may impact the
effectiveness of the remedy itself.67
It is sometimes very difficult to design an effective remedy without
imposing costs on third parties to the suit who may not even be violators.68
The courts should, however, be careful not to impose on such third parties
costs which may be viewed as unjust or unduly burdensome.69 Such
perceptions have the potential of creating resistance which undermines the
implementation of the selected remedy. Ignoring the costs on third parties
would amount to a failure to acknowledge the polycentric nature of
constitutional disputes.70
Consideration of the costs of the remedies is the essence of the idea of
‘remedial cost internalization’. According to this notion, the remedy should
limit the autonomy and choices of as few innocent individuals and
institutions as possible.71 The risk of non-compliance with the remedy
65 The text of case is available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990rcs3–
229/1990rcs3–229.html (last accessed 18 September 2006).
66 Shelton op cit note 14 at 54 and Cooper-Stephenson op cit note 19 at 36.
67 In the Canadian case of Lavoie v Nova Scotia (Attorney-General) (Lavioe case) 47
DLR (4th) 586 the court declined to make an order that the defendant establish
facilities for francophone students. The court said that it would not make such an
order until it was satisfied that the number of enrolled students was sufficient to justify
the cost, and it observed that the defendant’s interests in terms of costs had to be
considered as well (at 594).
68 Shelton op cit note 14 at 54.
69 See also Marius Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 383 at 412.
70 See Jamie Cassels ‘An inconvenient balance: The injunction as a Charter rem-
edy’ in Berryman op cit note 19, 271 at 300–3. See also Pieterse op cit note 69 at 412;
and Fuller op cit note 49.
71 Cooper-Stephenson op cit note 19 at 36.
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should itself be weighed as a cost that needs to be traded off against the
effectiveness of the remedy.72 A less effective remedy may be selected where
a more effective one heightens the risk of non-compliance. Gewirtz, for
instance, contends that factors such as public resistance to the remedy should
not be ignored:
‘Among the difficulties, indeed, the anguish, necessarily endured by those
seeking to produce change in the world is that at times they must cede ground
because of opposition. Remedies for violations of constitutional rights are not
immune from that reality.’73
The resistance encountered in the implementation of judicial decrees in
the United States school desegregation cases supports Gewirtz’s view.74 In
some cases it was feared that immediate implementation of the court decrees
would have exacerbated the resistance.75 All that the court did at the
beginning was to demand that the state desegregates the schools with all
deliberate speed. It was only after resistance was encountered that the courts
started giving concrete directions, in clear and precise terms, as to what was
to be done to rectify the violation.
An effective remedy is therefore one that embraces and takes account of
the problems that are likely to be encountered at the implementation stage.
The court should look at the end results of its remedy and consider its long
term effectiveness. Remedies which, for instance, impose high resource
burdens on the state may force the state to adopt long-term strategies that
will lead to the withdrawal of the challenged social programmes.76 A remedy
may be ignored simply because it is impossible to carry out, with the effect
that the ideal it protects comes to be regarded as unrealistic. It is important to
note that competing interests that are considered insufficient to override the
purposes of the rights at the rights determination stage could be relevant and
could be used at the remedial stage to limit the scope of the remedy. It is
72 Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 198.
73 Paul Gewirtz ‘Remedies and resistance’ (1983) 92 Yale LJ 585 at 588.
74 In the 1950s opposition to racial discrimination in public schools in the United
States reached its peak, culminating in a series of judicial decisions from both the state
and federal courts. The most significant decision in this direction was the 1955
United States Supreme Court case of Brown v Board of Education 349 US 294 (1955)
(Brown case). In this case, the Supreme Court upheld decisions of several lower courts
to the effect that racial discrimination in public education was unconstitutional and
had to be remedied. This ruling did not, however, go down well with some parts of
American society, resulting in resistance that affected implementation of the court
decrees. The resistance manifested itself in the form of violence, flight by white
people from public schools, boycotts, hostility, incitement, and foot-dragging by
public officials.
75 Shelton op cit note 14 at 54. See also Dennis Davis ‘Adjudicating the socio-
economic rights in the SouthAfrican Constitution: Towards ‘‘deference lite’’?’ (2006)
22 SAJHR 301 at 322.
76 Cooper-Stephenson op cit note 19 at 32.
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therefore not correct, as has been contended,77 that an effective remedy is
one that is capable of having an immediate effect.
In the United States school desegregation cases, for instance, white
resistance could not have been used to limit the right to equality and freedom
from discrimination; yet it was considered as limiting the scope of the
remedies the courts were willing to grant. This may have, in the short run,
appeared to be a limitation of the rights; yet it was calculated to give the
courts time to devise the means of countering the resistance. It also served to
preserve the legitimacy of the courts and to allow them to assert their
remedial powers in a gradual and acceptable manner. The courts were
merely taking cognisance of the fact that changing strongly held convictions
cannot be done immediately.78
III SOUTH AFRICA: CORRECTIVE OR DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE?
The South African courts have sought to extend their remedies beyond the
individual litigant by granting remedies that advance constitutional rights
that extend collective or group benefits. Though vindication and compensa-
tion of the victim has been acknowledged as a fundamental objective of
constitutional litigation, it is not the only objective that is to be achieved.
The interest that society has in the protection of the rights in the
Constitution and the interest that it has in the protection of the values of an
open and democratic society based on equality, freedom and human dignity,
too, are precepts that the courts wish to advance. The courts have also taken
into account the impact of proposed remedies on the defendant and how the
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff would be affected by a
particular remedy. The CC has, in some cases, been inclined towards putting
victims of constitutional violations in the position they would have been in
had the violation not occurred. However, in the same cases, the interests of
the community and the interests of the defendant, too, have featured in what
the court has called ‘a balancing process’.79
Though the South African Constitution does not, in express terms,
prescribe distributive justice, it is implicit in its provisions that it envisions
this form of justice. The Constitution is premised on the need to realize an
orderly and fair redistribution of resources80 — and in this respect it
demonstrates a commitment to the establishment of a society based, amongst
other things, on social justice.81 In addition to protecting individual rights,
the Constitution guarantees a number of socio-economic rights directly
77 See Mia Swart ‘Left out in the cold? Grafting constitutional remedies for the
poorest of the poor’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 215 at 217.
78 Roach op cit note 2 at 882. See also Special Project ‘The remedial process in
institutional reform litigation’ (1978) Columbia LR 784.
79 Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA1 (CC) (Hoffman case).
80 See Davis op cit note 75 at 304.
81 Preamble to the Constitution.
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linked to social justice.82 While socio-economic rights have elements that are
capable of extending individual entitlements, they also contain elements that
can be enjoyed only in a group.83 This is especially so in respect of the
positive elements of these rights which compel government to undertake
affirmative action to realize the rights and to provide goods and services
directed at all members of society or at groups of people and not at specific
individuals.
It would do little to advance the developmental objectives of the
Constitution if the full spectrum of rights of an individual or groups of
individuals is met while the rest of the community suffers. It is also difficult, if
not impossible, to sustain such levels of services in respect of individuals, let
alone the community. Consider, for instance, the right of access to water.84 It
requires the government to put in place water services provisions systems
that are accessible to everyone.85 The right of access to health care services is
not different.86 Hospitals and other health care facilities have to be
established for the benefit of all.
It is especially in respect of socio-economic rights that the transformative
nature of the Constitution has been underscored. The Constitution is
perceived as an instrument to transform South African society from a society
based on socio-economic deprivation to one based on equal distribution of
resources.87 The appropriate provision of services that were so drastically
skewed by the apartheid system is therefore considered to be central to the
transformative project of the Constitution.88 However, the enforcement of
socio-economic rights has generated much controversy arising from argu-
ments about the need to maintain the separation of powers. This is in
addition to questioning the institutional competence of the courts to enforce
these rights. However, even when it is accepted that socio-economic rights
are justiciable, there is always the question of whether they should be
enforced in a way that confers individual benefits or in a way that confers
group benefits.89 In the Constitution itself, most socio-economic rights are
82 Siri Gloppen South Africa: The Battle over the Constitution (1997) at 58.
83 Examples include elements of such rights as a clean and healthy environment
and also ingredients of such rights as housing and health that can be put in place for
the benefit of a number of people or groups of people.
84 Section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution.
85 See the Water ServicesAct 108 of 1997. See also Christopher Mbazira ‘Privatisa-
tion and the right of access to sufficient water in South Africa: The case of Lukhanji
andAmahlati’ in J W de Visser & C Mbazira (eds) Water delivery: Public or Private (2006)
57.
86 Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.
87 See, generally, Karl Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’
(1998) 14 SAJHR 146.
88 Pius Langa ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch LR 351 at
352.
89 Kent Roach ‘Crafting remedies for violations of economic, social and cultural
rights’ in John Squires, Malcolm Langford & Bret Thiele (eds) The Road to a Remedy:
Current Issues in the Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2005) 111.
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crafted as individual rights, as appears from formulations such as: ‘everyone
has the right to . . .’90 and ‘every child has the right to . . .’.91 Nonetheless,
the question remains whether the prevailing social and economic context
allows for the enforcement of these rights in the sense that they confer
individual benefits on demand — in which case corrective justice would be
applicable.
There is, therefore, a need to understand the existing socio-economic
context and its impact on the enforcement of socio-economic rights. It is
only by developing an understanding of the historical, social, political and
economic settings that one can appreciate the challenges inherent in
enforcing socio-economic rights in the sense of the conferral of individual
rather than collective benefits.92 According to De Vos:
‘it is not only the constitutional text that forms the context within which the
rights in the Bill of Rights must be viewed. In order to trace the direction in
which the transformative project is supposed to move it is necessary to come to
grips with the larger context within which the text of the Bill of Rights is to be
interpreted. Thus, the Constitutional Court has often stated that the historical,
social and economic context must be taken into account when interpreting the
provisions of the Bill of Rights.’93
In South Africa, socio-economic rights assume their importance from a
context of not only racially institutionalized poverty but also a commitment
to alleviate or eradicate such poverty.94 It is an offshoot of apartheid that the
majority of South Africans live in extreme poverty. It is on the basis of this
context that the Constitution ‘sets as one of its primary aims the
transformation of society into a more just and equitable place’.95 One of the
obstacles to the realization of this objective, however, is limited financial
resources. The available resources are not adequate to facilitate immediate
provision of socio-economic goods and services to everyone on demand as
individual rights. Holistic approaches to providing socio-economic goods
and services that focus beyond the individual are the most practical to
implement. This is what the existing social and economic conditions dictate.
Therefore one has to rethink the traditional idea that remedies must be
immediate and that the courts must give one-shot remedies that achieve
corrective justice.96 Remedies of this nature may not be practicable and
rights may have to be enforced in ways that provide collective benefits. This
90 Sections 26(1) and 27(1) of the Constitution.
91 Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution.
92 A J van der Walt ‘The state’s duty to protect owners v the state’s duty to provide
housing: Thoughts on the Modderklip case’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 144 at 148.
93 Pierre de Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality
as contextual fairness’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 258 at 262 (emphasis in the original, footnote
omitted).
94 A J van der Walt ‘A South African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of social
justice’ (2004) 19 South African Public Law 253 at 255.
95 De Vos op cit note 93 at 260.
96 Roach op cit note 89.
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is particularly so in a context where scarce financial resources dictate how
government fulfils its obligations in respect of the realization of socio-
economic rights.
The realization of these rights in contexts of scarce resources requires
careful redistribution of the resources to benefit all in need of them. It is at
this stage that the notion of distributive justice becomes most relevant. The
courts have to focus beyond the immediate needs of the individual and must
consider the interests of society as a whole or groups of people within
society. Individual rights therefore have to be balanced against the collective
welfare.97 It has been submitted, for instance, that it would have been
senseless to extend expensive treatment to Mr Soobramoney ‘at a time when
many poor people . . . had little or no access to any form of even primary
health care services’.98 The CC had to leave it up to the hospital to decide
how best to utilize scarce medical resources in a distributive manner without
prioritizing individual needs at the expense of others who may need such
resources.
It is on the basis of this approach that the CC has rejected the notion that
the socio-economic rights provisions in the Constitution confer individual
entitlements on demand. The CC has also rejected the notion that the
Constitution be interpreted as establishing a minimum core which entitles
every individual to a minimum level of goods and services on demand.99 The
CC has, furthermore, rejected the notion that s 28 of the Constitution
guarantees every child access to basic nutrition, shelter, and health services
irrespective of available resources. Instead, the CC has chosen to locate the
claims of all individuals, adults and children within the broader dimension of
society’s needs. According to the CC, all that the state is obligated to do is to
put in place a reasonable programme, reasonably implemented to achieve the
progressive realization of socio-economic rights, subject to the available
resources. The programme must be inclusive of the needs of all people and
must address short, medium and long term needs.100
97 Ziyad Motala & Cyril Ramaphosa Constitutional Law: Analysis and cases (2002) at
34.
98 De Vos op cit note 92 at 259–60.
99 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (Grootboom case) 2001
(1) SA 46 (CC) para 32 and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC case)
2002 (5) SA721 (CC). See also Theunis Roux ‘Legitimating transformation: Political
resource allocation in the SouthAfrican Constitutional Court’ (2003) 10 Democratiza-
tion 92; Sandra Liebenberg ‘Enforcing positive socio-economic rights claims: The
South African model of reasonableness’ in Squires, Langford & Thiele op cit note 89
at 73; David Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its
importance’ (2002) 118 SAJHR 484; and David Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable
approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for future socio-economic
rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 1.
100 See the Grootboom and TAC cases supra note 99.
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The Constitution is imbued with the values upon which a democratic
South Africa is based101 and the courts are constitutionally obliged to
promote these values whenever interpreting the Bill of Rights.102 Though
some of the values may be used to promote individual welfare, the CC has
used the concept of values to advance the common good of society. Even
when protecting individual rights the CC has on some occasions used values
that promote general welfare to justify such individualized protection.103
The Constitution itself, however, does not describe in an exhaustive
manner the values upon which it is based. This has forced the courts on some
occasions to look outside the Constitution for the values that should guide
constitutional interpretation.104 To effectively use these external values not
necessarily found in the Constitution, the CC has freed itself from textualism
as the only method of constitutional interpretation and has used other
methods such as purposive interpretation105 to give effect the values
underlying the Constitution.106 In the Makwanyane case, for instance, the
CC used this method of interpretation to read into the Constitution the
value of ‘ubuntu’, a concept permeated by the notion of distributive
justice.107
It has been submitted that although ubuntu is not mentioned in the
Constitution it coincides with some of the values expressly mentioned.108
The CC has indeed found no problem using ubuntu to promote distributive
justice.109 The court has, for instance, used the value of ubuntu as the basis
101 Section 1 of the Constitution. The values include human dignity, the achieve-
ment of equality and advancement of human rights and freedoms; non-racialism and
non-sexism; supremacy of the Constitution; and universal adult suffrage, a national
common voter’s roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic gov-
ernment, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.
102 Section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution.
103 An example of this, as discussed later, is the use of the concept of ubuntu to
advance the individual’s right to life. The individual has, therefore, been located as
part of society and cannot be singled out for protection irrespective of the needs of
others. See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA391 (CC) (Makwanyane case).
104 See Irma J Kroeze ‘Doing things with values: The role of constitutional values in
constitutional interpretation’ (2001) 12 Stellenbosch LR 265 at 267–8.
105 Also referred to as ‘value oriented’ or ‘teleological’ interpretation; see Johan de
Waal & M G Erasmus ‘The constitutional jurisprudence of South African courts on
the application, interpretation and limitation of fundamental rights during the transi-
tion’ (1996) 7 Stellenbosch LR 179 at 181n8.
106 Makwanyane case supra note 102 para 9. See also S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401
(CC) para 15.
107 See, generally, Irma J Kroeze ‘Doing things with values II: The case of ubuntu’
(2002) 13 Stellenbosch LR 252.
108 Ibid at 256.
109 In the Makwanyane case supra note 102 para 224, the CC described ubuntu as a
culture which places some emphasis on communality and on interdependence of
members of a community. It recognizes a person’s status as a human being, entitled to
unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the com-
munity such person happens to be part of. See also para 263.
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for setting aside an order of excessive damages against the defendant in a case
of defamation.110 It has also held that ubuntu requires that in cases of
defamation the remedy granted should aim to restore a harmonious human
and social relationship: ‘Historically . . . [ubuntu] was foundational to the
spirit of reconciliation and bridge-building that enabled our deeply
traumatized society to overcome and transcend the division of the past’.111
Today, according to the court, ubuntu represents the element of human
solidarity that binds together liberty and equality and creates an affirmative
and mutually supportive triad of central constitutional values.112
The promotion of constitutional values has therefore been central in the
transformative enterprise of the CC. In constitutional litigation, protection
has been accorded to individual needs only if they do not negatively impact
on collective interests. This is reflected not only in the interpretation of the
substantive content of the rights but also in the determination of the kinds of
remedies that their violation demands. This approach has made it inevitable
that the court would incline toward the notion of distributive justice in
developing the concept of an ‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy — as is
set out in detail in the next section.
Defining ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief ’
Other than merely enforce the values that promote commonality, The CC’s
resort to the ethos of distributive justice is reflected not merely in its
enforcement of the values that promote commonality but also in its approach
to granting remedies for the infringement of constitutional rights. The
Constitution gives courts very wide remedial powers to ‘grant appropriate
relief, including a declaration of rights’113 and to make ‘any order that is just
and equitable’.114 The test for the effectiveness of the courts’ remedies,
therefore, is whether the remedy is ‘appropriate, just and equitable’. It is
important to note, however, that a court’s definition of what amounts to an
‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy will be determined, among other
things, by the notion of justice favoured by that court. In this respect, the
phrase ‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy could assume two meanings.
On the one hand, it could refer to a remedy that is required by an individual
whose rights have been violated in order to put him or her in the position he
or she would have been in but for the violation. On the other hand, it could
mean a remedy that focuses on all interests implicated by the case and
balances these interests against those of the individual plaintiff in the case.115
As seen above,116 because of the bipolar nature of the theory of corrective
110 In Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006(6) SA235 (CC) (Mokhatla case).
111 Ibid para 113 [footnote omitted].
112 Ibid.
113 Section 38 of the Constitution.
114 Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution.
115 Roach op cit note 11 at 3–4.
116 See section 2.1 above.
‘APPROPRIATE, JUST AND EQUITABLE RELIEF’ 89
justice, the burdens imposed by a remedy on third parties do not constitute a
factor to be considered when choosing remedies.117 In contrast, distributive
justice pays attention to the interests not only of the parties to the case but
also of third parties. The remedy should be intended not only for the benefit
of the plaintiff but for other similarly situated persons.
It is on the basis of the above that the CC has taken cognizance of the fact
that when constitutional rights are violated — though the victim may be an
individual — society as a whole is injured.118 If any remedies are to be
obtained for such violations, they should be aimed at vindicating not only
the victim but also advancing the interests of society as a whole.119 Even
where an individual victim is clearly identifiable, any subsequent remedy is
likely to have an impact on other persons and on society at large.120 It is for
this reason that the notion of distributive justice requires that courts be
considerate not only to the interests of the parties but also the interests of
society at large.121
It is on the basis of this that the CC has adopted an approach that spreads
the benefits of constitutional litigation beyond the parties in a particular case.
In Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) v President of the Republic of South
Africa,122 for instance, the court observed that
‘[t]he resources of the State have to be deployed . . . in a manner which best
brings relief and hope to the widest sections of the community, developing for
the benefit of the entire nation the latent human potential and resources of
every person who has directly or indirectly been burdened with the heritage of
the shame and the pain of our racist past’.123
On certain occasions the CC has also rejected proposed out-of-court
settlements between the parties if it would result in a benefit of a
constitutional right only to the parties.124 The court has held that an offer to
settle a dispute made by one litigant to another, if accepted, cannot cure the
ensuing legal uncertainty which results from the fact that it would settle the
dispute only between litigants. According to the court, this would not
resolve the question of the possible unconstitutionality of the impugned
provisions and their effect on the broader group of persons who may qualify
for a similar benefit.125 The court has also in certain circumstances declined
to award remedies even where a violation of a constitutional right has been
117 Roach op cit note 11 at 3–21.
118 In the Hoffman case supra note 79 para 43.
119 Roach op cit note 11 at 3–30.
120 Shelton op cit note 14 at 52. See also Cassels op cit note 70 at 290.
121 Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law
(2001) 288.
122 1996 (4) SA671 (CC).
123 Para 43.
124 See Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Develop-
ment 2004 (6) SA505 (CC) (Khosa case).
125 Khosa case supra note 124 para 35.
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proved if the interests of good governance require that a remedy should not
be given.126
To consider the interests of all those who may be affected by the outcome
of the case requires a balancing of all the affected interests. The CC has
observed that the balancing process must be guided , first, by the objective of
addressing the wrong occasioned by the infringement of the constitutional
right; secondly, by the objective of deterring violations; and thirdly, by the
objective of giving an order that can be complied with. This is in addition to
ensuring fairness to all those who might be affected by the relief.127
Accordingly, successful litigants should obtain the relief they seek only when
the interests of good government do not demand otherwise. The position of
the CC therefore is that litigants before the court should not be singled out
for the grant of relief, but relief should, taking account of the obvious
limitations of litigation, as far as possible be afforded to all people who are in
the same situation as the litigants.128 This is important because, despite the
fact that South Africa has an advanced constitutional system, courts are still
not easily accessible to all.129 Any remedies granted in constitutional
litigation should, as far as possible, therefore extend the constitutional
benefits to those without easy access to courts.
As noted above, in the Mokhatla case, for instance, the CC held that the
principal objective of the law is ‘restoration of harmonious human and social
relationships where they have been ruptured by an infraction of community
norms’.130 The court held that, instead of awarding damages that merely put
a hole in the defendant’s pocket, the law of defamation should strive to
re-establish harmony between the parties.131 This is because an award of
excessive damages would have implications on free expression, which is the
lifeblood of a democratic society.132 What this means is that vindicating the
plaintiff’s injury by awarding excessive damages should be foregone for the
sake of maintaining society’s right to freedom of expression. The court in the
Mokhatla case suggested that consideration should be given to the impact the
remedy has on the defendant. According to the court, if the plaintiff’s rights
can be vindicated and restoration achieved using remedies less burdensome
to the defendant, this approach should be adopted.133
The CC’s approach here is in accord with the notion of cost internaliza-
126 See East Zulu Motors (Pty) v Empangeni/Ngwlezane Transitional Local Council 1998
(2) SA61 (CC) and Steyn v The State 2001 (1) SA1146 (CC).
127 Hoffman case supra note 79 para 45.
128 S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 32. Cited with approval in Minister of
Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention (Nicro) 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC)
para 74.
129 Jackie Dugard ‘Court of first instance? Towards a pro-poor jurisdiction for the
SouthAfrican Constitutional Court’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 261 at 266.
130 Supra note 109 para 68.
131 Ibid.
132 See ibid paras 54 and 92.
133 Ibid paras 64, 67, 112 and 113.
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tion which, as discussed above,134 requires the court to consider the costs
which any remedy it may grant will have on the defendant. Prohibitive costs
increase the risk of non-compliance with the remedy. The CC has pushed
this notion further by not only considering the costs of non-compliance to
society, but also the benefits that society may derive by compliance. This
explains why the court has been reluctant to award damages if these would,
for instance, have a negative impact on freedom of expression.
The CC has indeed doubted the appropriateness of damages as a
public-law remedy and as the most appropriate method to enforce
constitutional rights.135 The court has held that there is no real evidence that
awarding punitive damages will serve as a significant deterrent against
individual or systemic repetition of infringements.136 According to the court,
an award of punitive damages, if it is to have a deterrent effect on
government, should be substantial. The problem, in the CC’s opinion, is that
this will bring a windfall to a single plaintiff and yet similarly situated victims
would not be entitled to similar awards.137 In addition, substantial awards
made against government will significantly impact on the available revenue
and could therefore impinge on the executive’s ability to function
effectively. Though the CC has acknowledged the fact that punitive damages
may lead to systemic change, it is of the view that the process might be slow
and that it might require a substantial number of such awards before change
is induced. Yet, such change could be achieved using equitable relief which is
far cheaper and faster.138
In the context of socio-economic-rights litigation, one cannot use only
the situation of the litigants to judge whether the remedy of the court is an
‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy as is suggested by some authors.139
Instead, one should assess the overall impact of the remedy on the state’s
policy or policies touching on the right in issue. One should ask, for instance,
whether the state has overhauled its policy to reflect the elements of a
reasonable policy as defined by the CC. Taking the example of the Grootboom
case:140 the judgment may not have resulted in tangible goods and services
for the Grootboom community, but, generally, the decision has forced
government to shift its housing programme to have regard to the needs of
people in intolerable conditions and those threatened with eviction.141
Government has adopted an emergency housing policy to cater for people
who may find themselves in situations similar to that of the Grootboom
134 See section 2.2 above.
135 See generally the Rail Commuters case supra note 64.
136 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA786 (CC) (Fose case) para 71.
137 Ibid para 71.
138 Ibid para 65(d).
139 See Swart op cit note 77 at 216.
140 Supra note 99.
141 Geoff Budlender ‘Justiciability of socio-economic rights: Some South African
experiences’ in Yash Ghai & Jill Cottrell (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
Practice (2004) 33 at 41.
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community.142 Whether such policy is being implemented, though relevant,
is another issue. The important point here is that the judgment has provided
advocates of socio-economic rights with a tool to assess the reasonableness of
government’s socio-economic programmes.
It should be noted, however, that not all remedies directed at the
individual are irrelevant. There are cases in which a remedy, though directed
at the individual, has the potential to advance the interests of society as a
whole. This is especially so where the remedy has the potential to play an
effective deterrent role and to benefit similarly situated people. In the
Hoffman case,143 though the remedy appeared to be directed at the individual
victim, the CC was convinced that it would benefit similarly situated people.
In this case, the court considered instatement of prospective employee
denied employment because of his HIV status to be the most appropriate
relief.144 The CC held that
‘[an order of instatement] . . . is an expression of the general rule that where a
wrong has been committed, the aggrieved person should, as a general matter,
and as far as is possible, be placed in the same position the person would have
been but for the wrong suffered’.145
However, the Court was quick to add that the remedy would have wider
application beyond the individual victim and would only be granted where
practicable.146 It observed that instatement would serve a general deterrent
role as it strikes effectively at unfair discrimination. This is because ‘[i]t sends
a message that under our Constitution discrimination will not be tolerated
and thus ensures future compliance’.147 It could, for example, be argued that
large corporations may have been willing to pay extensive financial
compensation in lieu of employing HIV/AIDS positive persons.
The approach in the Hoffman case shows that courts should not be
dismissive of an individualized remedy in its entirety if there is evidence that
it would have wide implications by, for instance, promoting deterrence. This
is because deterrence forestalls future violation of the rights which benefits
society as a whole.
IV CONCLUSION
It is important that, in our critique of the remedies granted by the courts in
constitutional litigation, we should seek to understand the mode of justice
that they employ. Criticisms of the remedies granted by the CC on the
142 National Department of Housing National Housing Code Part 3: National Housing
Programme Chapter 12: Housing Assistance in Emergency Circumstances April 2004, avail-
able at http://www.housing.gov.za/Content/legislation_policies/Emergency%20%
20Housing%20Policy.pdf (last accessed 12April 2006).
143 Supra note 79.
144 Ibid para 50.
145 Ibid para 50.
146 Ibid para 53.
147 Ibid para 52.
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ground that they fail to individualize socio-economic rights could wrongly
be based on the perception of remedies having exclusively a corrective role.
It needs to be understood that the realization of socio-economic rights in the
sense of granting individual entitlements immediately may not be feasible in
South Africa. At a seminar held at the end of May in 2006,148 a participant
questioned the usefulness of the Grootboom case if the plight of the people of
the Grootboom community has not changed positively. This criticism, and
others of a similar nature, stress the corrective role of litigation and negate its
role in promoting distributive justice. There is agreement by many scholars
in the area of socio-economic rights that the Grootboom case has helped
positively to influence policy and legislation in respect of socio-economic
rights.149
The inclination of the South African courts toward the notion of
distributive justice is an indication of the context in which the courts enforce
human constitutional rights. provisions, including those that constitute
socio-economic rights, cannot be construed outside the social, economic
and political context in which the Constitution operates. The current South
African context, characterized by high levels of poverty and constrained state
resources, makes it impossible to grant everyone individual socio-economic
goods and services on demand. There are wider societal interests that have to
be considered — and these interests may dictate the negation of the
individual interests of the litigant; and this is where distributive justice helps
us understand the remedial approach of the courts.
148 Strengthening strategies for promoting socio-economic rights in South Africa, held in
Cape Town 29- 30 May 2006, organized by the Community Law Centre, University
of the Western Cape and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of
Oslo.
149 See Sandra Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-
economic rights: An effective tool in challenging poverty’ (2002) 2 Law, Democracy
and Development 159 at 177–80. See Kameshni Pillay ‘Implementation of Grootboom:
Implications for the enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2002) 2 Law, Democracy
and Development 225 at 256–7.
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